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Abstract—Mobile IPv6 will be the basis for the fourth generation 
4G networks which will completely revolutionize the way 
telecommunication devices operate. This paradigm shift will occur 
due to the sole use of packed switching networks. Mobile IPv6 
utilizes binding updates as a route optimization to reduced triangle 
routing between the mobile node, the home agent and the 
correspondent node, allowing direct communication between the 
mobile node and the correspondent. However, direct communication 
between the nodes produces a range of security vulnerabilities, which 
the home agent avoided. This paper attempts to provide the 
advantages of using the home agent as an intermediary whilst 
reducing the latency of triangle routing. This can be achieved with 
the proposed use of a mobile home agent which essentially follows 
the mobile node as it moves between points of attachment providing 
location privacy and pseudo-direct communication, which can be 
incorporated into the distributed authentication protocol or be used as 
a stand alone solution.   
 
Keywords—Mobile Home Agent, MIPv6, Distributed 
Authentication Protocol, 4G, Location Privacy.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
obile IPv6 is the next step in the evolution of 
networking. The most widely used internet protocols are 
ones currently based on IPv4 networks which are restricted to 
32 bit addresses. This provides a finite number of IP addresses 
which, over time, has become limited to the number of 
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devices which need them. Network address translation has 
helped to delay the need for more address. However a new 
Internet protocol was inevitably created to solve this issue, 
IPv6. IPv6 addresses are 128 bit providing 3.4×1038 
addresses which solves the issue of address limitation 
however as most devices are becoming mobile, IPv6 provides 
no method for them to migrate to a new location as the IP 
addresses are static [1]. 
Mobile IPv6 solves this issue by providing an infrastructure 
which allows the mobile node to acquire a new address every 
time it moves to a new point of attachment and yet still remain 
reachable as it has a home agent which has an IP address 
which remains static and also keeps track of the mobile node’s 
current location. The home agent is the first point of contact 
when attempting to contact the mobile node as the home agent 
acts as a proxy and tunnels messages to the mobile node. This 
is called triangle routing and the latency of communication 
between the nodes increases the further away the mobile node 
travels from the home agent [2].  
The introduction of the route optimization protocol allows 
the mobile node to communicate directly with its 
correspondents with the use of binding updates. However 
these are vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as 
interception, modification, impersonation and redirection. 
Binding updates are also susceptible to denial of service 
attacks.  
However, several security solutions have been created 
which attempt to protect the binding updates, such as CAM 
[3] and the distributed authentication protocol [4]. But non of 
these address the issue of location privacy, for if the attacker 
is unable to determine the location of the mobile node, he will 
not be able to attack it.   
This paper will look at the advantages and disadvantages of 
current location privacy security solutions in Mobile IPv6. It 
will then look at the new technology of mobile autonomous 
software agents, which can exist and move independently 
within heterogeneous networks. The paper will then go on to 
suggest that mobile agents can be used in a security solution 
where they will act as mobile home agents providing location 
privacy without increasing communication latency. This 
solution can be used as a stand alone solution or be used as 
part of the distributed authentication protocol.  
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II.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Before a security solution can be designed for a future 
telecommunication network, it is wise and vital to take a look 
at the emerging technologies and economical factors, which 
may impact the very core of the telecommunications industry, 
as we know it. This paper will present some predictions of 
which technologies will be incorporated into the Forth 
Generation of mobile telecommunications, technologies, 
which may have such a fundamental impact, that it will create 
a paradigm shift in the way the service is run. Only then can 
the network architecture be understood and a security solution 
crafted to adequately take advantage of its environment. This 
paper attempts to find a solution to prevent binding updates in 
Mobile Ipv6 from being susceptible to masquerading, 
impersonation attacks and provide location privacy to the 
mobile and correspondent nodes. 
Mobile IP has primarily been designed for the ease of mobility 
of communicating devices. It is the underlining architecture 
for the fourth generation of mobile phones. Due to the nature 
of TCP/IP, only static IP addresses are permitted to be used 
within the network. This causes problems for mobile nodes, 
which wish to migrate to a new location yet still remain 
connected to the network. This is because physically moving 
to another location results in a new attachment to a wireless 
network node and as a result the IP address would change. 
Mobile IP solves this issue by employing two addresses [5].  
The First address belongs to the home agent, which acts as a 
proxy for the mobile node and ensures the mobile node 
remains reachable by having a static address.  
The mobile node itself has a dynamic address and this changes 
every time the node is associated with another point of 
attachment. Each time the mobile node migrates to a new 
location, it is assigned a new IP address and the home agent is 
informed of that new address. A node wishing to contact the 
mobile node must contact the home agent, which will tunnel 
the data packets to the current address of the mobile node. 
Correspondent nodes communicate by sending packets to the 
mobile nodes static address, which are then forwarded to the 
mobile node. This is called triangle routing and can have an 
impact on communication latency. To avoid latency issues 
binding updates were introduced to allow the mobile node to 
communicate directly with the correspondent node by 
bypassing the home agent, with the use of a binding update. 
This keeps the home agent and the correspondent node aware 
of the mobile nodes’ current location and allows for direct 
communication. Binding updates however are susceptible to 
security attacks such as interception and impersonation. This 
can be used by an attacker to mount man in the middle, 
redirection and denial of service attacks [6]. The distributed 
authentication protocol [4] has been designed to prevent or at 
least limit this attack from taking place. However, no matter 
the security in place within the network infrastructure, if the 
address of the mobile node is known, it is easily susceptible to 
direct attacks such as D.o.S from malicious sources. Can 
looking at current and future technologies and solutions, 
which may be implemented and incorporated into 4G 
technology, allow for improvements in the security design? 
III. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
Second generation telecommunications, utilise the circuit 
switched GSM network to provide a dedicated line for the 
duration of the call. With the intermediate generational leap to 
2.5G, bandwidth speeds have not necessarily increased but 
support for packet switching of data has been implemented 
with the use of GPRS. The Third generation systems have 
been initially designed to provide both circuit switched and 
packet switched domains for voice and data respectively. 
However an alternate access network, from 2G systems, needs 
to be used such as UMTS or CDMA 2000 [7].  
Unlike 3G, Fourth Generation systems are based on packet 
switching only. The method of transmission of voice calls is 
done with the use of Voice over IP, (VoIP) [8]. This splits 
voice into data packets, which are sent across the Internet, 
which are reassembled at the destination address. The 
advantage is that there is no dedicated line created for the call 
as packets can take any path they choose, however during 
some network conditions voice calls can suffer a loss of 
quality.  
4G Mobile devices will use Mobile Ipv6 addresses to identify 
themselves. This of course does not mean telephone numbers 
will become obsolete as then can be resolved in the same way 
a web page address is found in a look up table giving its IP 
address. This does mean however that mobile phones will 
operate in a similar way to the infrastructure of broadband 
Internet in the home. This could possible mean that 
telecommunication companies in effect become Internet 
service providers, and as such, instead of paying for a 
telephone subscription we may have an ISP subscription 
instead [9].  
Even if companies try to keep the lucrative business models, 
which they currently enjoy, consumers may find cheaper 
alternatives such as the Skype service [10], [11] which 
provides free PC-to-PC calls. As time moves on its highly 
likely that mobile devices will become comparable in 
processing power of a PDA or even a low end computer. This 
means that applications such as Skype will find its way to 
mobile devices and telecom (ISP) companies will find 
themselves losing revenue.  
ISPs will change their business plan to a more service 
orientated market and try to generate revenue from killer 
applications such as premium content music, videos and live 
streaming television IPTV.  
Payments for these services would of course need to be 
secure, combining a range of technologies such as encryption 
and authentication to prevent sensitive payment details from 
falling into the wrong hands. Of course if an attacker is 
unaware of the location of a potential victim this makes it very 
difficult for an attack to take place. This is where location 
privacy comes in and this paper introduces a way of achieving 
this through the use of mobile agents which are autonomous 
software agents.  These will prevent interception of data 
within the network however an attacker can still intercept data 
between the signal sent from the mobile device and the point 
of attachment. 
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As 4G devices will operate at much high bandwidth speeds 
modern GSM and 3G radio frequencies would not be able to 
cope with the demand put on it so it is most likely that 4G will 
operate on high speed frequencies most likely based on WI-
FI. Of course the drawback then is that WI-FI has a limited 
range in comparison to GSM. The most likely method of 
wireless transmission is WiMAX, which can cover a large 
metropolitan area [12]. However it is more likely that this will 
be used as a backbone for last mile delivery of high-speed 
broadband to the home. Fortunately it is interoperable with 
other wireless standards allowing for WI-FI enabled 
phones/nodes to communicate with each other by 
interconnecting them.  
The WiMax standard utilises a scheduling MAC, which 
allocates a time slot to the base station as opposed to Wi-Fi’s 
contention access where all nodes are competing for the base 
stations attention randomly. This makes WiMax more stable 
for the purpose of mobile communications. WiMAX also has 
the potential for mesh networking allowing users to connect to 
each other by bypassing the infrastructure or allowing nodes 
to become part of the infrastructure that would otherwise be 
out of range. 
IV. CURRENT SOLUTIONS 
Mobile IPv6 Binding updates are vulnerable to attacks such 
as interception and impersonation. Numerous security 
solutions have been proposed to protect mobile IPv6 networks 
and each has their advantages and disadvantages. The two 
main types of security are encryption and authentication. 
Encryption protects the confidentiality of the data and 
authentication allows users to verify that they are 
communicating with validated participants. Different 
authentication systems exist, such as Kerberos [13] that 
perform authentication by referring to a central authentication 
database to compare users credentials. 
Other security components include hashes [14], digital 
signatures [15], address based keys [16] and cryptographically 
generated addresses [17]. 
More elaborate systems such as IPSEC [18] and RADIUS 
[19] based on AAA Authentication, authorization and 
accounting [20], require the utilization of a central 
authentication authority. These techniques may not be 
practical for a mobile environment, and could effectively 
reduce the users quality of service. 
Security protocols, which have been specifically designed 
for the protection of binding updates such as, Bake/2 [21] and 
CAM [3] are good but have flaws. The Trinity protocol [22] 
introduced a third node to aid in authentication but the 
addition of new hardware proved to be impractical. However, 
the two main techniques, which have practically become 
standardised for binding update security, are: 
Cryptographically generated addresses and return routability. 
 
A. CGA 
Cryptographically generated addresses [17] are IPv6 
addresses, which are generated by hashing the owner’s public 
key. The address owner uses the corresponding private key to 
assert address ownership and to sign messages from that 
address without PKI or some other security infrastructure. 62 
bits of the interface identifier can be used to store a 
cryptographic hash of the public key.  
 
                 Host ID = HASH62(public key)         
(1) 
 
The CGA binds a users public key to an IPv6 address. The 
binding between the public key and the address can be 
verified by re-computing and comparing the hash value of the 
public key and other parameters sent in the specific message 
with the interface identifier in the IPv6 address belonging to 
the owner [23]. A major problem, which should be understood 
is that, an attacker can always create its own CGA address but 
will not be able to spoof someone else's address since the 
message needs to be signed with the corresponding private 
key, which is only known only by the legitimate owner. 
The aim of CGA is to prevent stealing and spoofing of 
existing IPv6 addresses. CGA assures that the interface 
identifier part of the address is correct, but does little to ensure 
that the node is actually reachable at that identifier and prefix 
[23]. As a result, CGA needs to be used together with a 
reachability test such as return routability, where redirection 
denial-of-service attacks are a concern. 
 
B.  Return routability 
Return routability tests whether packets addressed to the 
two claimed addresses are routed to the mobile node. The 
Return Routability Procedure gives the correspondent node 
some reasonable assurance that the mobile node is addressable 
at its claimed care-of address and its home address. Only with 
this assurance is the correspondent node able to accept 
Binding Updates from the mobile node [2]. The return 
routability test is the most effective way to limit bombing 
attacks of the mobile's new address. The correspondent only 
accepts the binding update if the mobile is able to return the 
hash of a secret value sent in a packet to the new location. 
This proves that the mobile can receive packets at the address 
where it claims to be [5]. 
Some malicious entities on the correspondent's local 
network may be able to capture a test packet but the number 
of potential attackers is dramatically reduced. The return 
routability test is complementary to CGA-based BU 
authentication, which does not prevent bombing of the home 
network [5]. 
Several solutions have been created in an attempt to solve 
the issue of Identity protection in Mobile IPv6. Each have 
their advantages and disadvantages and are discussed here: 
 
C.   BLIND  
BLIND is a security framework that provides identity 
protection against active and passive attacks for end-points. A 
two-round-trip authenticated Diffe-Hellman Key Exchange 
Protocol that protects the initiator's and responder's identity is 
presented in [24].  
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The protocol hides the public key based identifiers from 
attackers and eavesdroppers by blinding the identifiers. The 
protocol completes the identity protection by offering location 
privacy with forwarding agents. An end-point must negotiate 
a key exchange with its peer via the forwarding agent to 
obtain location privacy.  
The forwarding agent provides location privacy by hiding 
the real location of the node. The peers are able to see only the 
virtual address, not the real address of the end-point. A 
cryptographic hash of the public key end point identifier 
(EID) is called a fingerprint.  
Each party creates scrambled versions of the fingerprints 
and use each scrambled value only during one protocol run. 
This makes it impossible to correlate independent protocol 
runs. 
 
D.   Authorised Anonymous ID  
To address the issue of location privacy, [25] introduces the 
idea of an authorized anonymous ID based scheme, which 
eliminates the need for a trusted server or administration.  
A cryptographic technique called blind signatures are used 
to generate an authorized anonymous ID which is used to 
replay the real ID of the mobile device. To address location 
privacy issues, an architecture was designed on the Wireless 
Andrew 802.11 WLAN network which used a centralized 
location server which stored the location data of registered 
mobile users.  
It is suggested in [25] that a distributed architecture would 
be more appropriate as a centralized architecture has 
drawbacks. 
 
E.   Temporal Mobile Identifier (TMI)  
Various ways are suggested in [26] in which to prevent 
location information leakage.  One way to do this is to hide 
the home address of the mobile node from third parties by 
using a temporal mobile identifier.  
In MIPv6 packets transmitted contain the addresses of the 
mobile node and home address in clear text in the header. This 
can allow an eavesdropper to identify packets and track 
mobile movement. One solution is to use a Temporal Mobile 
Identifier (TMI) for each mobile node. This is a random 128 
bit sequence which can identify the mobile node to other 
nodes. The TMI replaces the home address in the header of 
packets and has the effect of hiding the mobile home network 
identity from the correspondent and eavesdroppers.  
An alternative method would be not to use binding updates 
at all and use bi-directional tunneling. This means the 
correspondent sends all packets to the home address, which 
then encapsulates them and forwards them to the care of 
address.  
If route optimization is used then the binding update must 
contain the TMI in the home address option and the binding 
update must be encrypted. 
 
 
F.   Hierarchical Mobile IPv6  
The hierarchical mobile IP management model [26] utilizes 
a new node called a mobility anchor point (MAP). It provides 
a central point to assist with hand offs. It can be located at any 
level in a hierarchical network including the access router 
(AR). 
In the basic mode of Hierarchical mobile IP, the mobile 
node has two address, a regional care of address (RCoA) and 
on the MAP’s subnet an on link care of address (LCoA) [27]. 
The MAP acts as a local home agent that maps the mobile 
node’s regional care of address to its on link care of address. 
The mobile node has the option of hiding its on link care of 
address from the corresponding nodes and its home agent by 
using its regional care of address in the source field in the 
packets it sends.  However an eavesdropper can still determine 
the mobile nodes home address by snooping the packets. 
V. MOBILE AGENTS 
Traditionally programs are executed on one machine; perform 
a task and end execution on the same machine. The next step 
in evolution for software is to become mobile. Tasks that have 
started execution on one machine can now be paused, “jump” 
to another computer and continue execution there. This is 
possible with mobile agents and opens up a new dimension in 
computer programming and usage.  
Mobile agents are autonomous applications, which features 
the behavior of autonomy, social ability, learning and most 
importantly, mobility. Mobile agents can move from host to 
host in a heterogeneous network by saving its current state, 
performing a move to another host via data duplication and 
then resuming execution from the saved state. This means that 
they can control their own actions and move to different 
machines and execute on them at any time regardless of 
operation or operating system [28].  
The traditional client/server model shows that the client sends 
a message to the server and the server replies (fig 1).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Client Server Model 
 
They perform a continuous dialogue until the task is complete. 
Mobile agents work in a different way [29]. Their approach is 
to contain the user’s data and instructions within the agent and 
dispatch it to a destination computer and there the agent 
communicates with the server at the server side (fig 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Agent communication with server 
 
 
 
The benefit of this is that it reduces the network load and frees 
up bandwidth, it also allows for faster communication [30]. 
P.C Server
P.C ServerA 
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 This is a very attractive technology for the purposes of 
Mobile IP and as you will see in the proposed solution mobile 
agents can be used to facilities network messages and location 
privacy. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Mobile IPv6 provides two methods of communication 
between the mobile and correspondent node. The first is 
triangle routing which is when all communication to the 
mobile node is via the home agent. This is necessary as the 
home agents’ IP address is static and is the first point of 
contact for any communication to the mobile node. The 
disadvantage however is that the further the mobile node 
travels from the home agent the further data packets will have 
to travel to reach their destination. 
The second method involves the use of a route optimization 
technique which allows direct communication between the 
mobile and correspondent node. This is achieved with the use 
of binding updates. The disadvantage to this method is that the 
location of the mobile node is revealed to any correspondent 
in communication with it, which could be a potential security 
risk. 
This paper introduces an alternative method which provides 
the best of both worlds without the disadvantages. 
A.  Mobile Agents technology introduced in to Mobile 
IPv6 
The concept involves the introduction of mobile agent 
technology into mobile IPv6 networks. The way they would 
be used is as an intermediary between the mobile node and the 
correspondent effectively becoming triangle routing. However 
the mobile agent would reside on the IPv6 node which the 
mobile node is using as its point of attachment. The mobile 
agent is a piece of software responsible for routing messages 
from other nodes to the mobile node and at the same time 
provide location privacy by acting as a proxy and masking the 
true IP address of the mobile node.  As the mobile agent 
resides on the mobile nodes point of attachment there is 
negligible latency in comparison to triangle routing via the 
home agent. As the mobile agent will effectively resume most 
of the roles of the home agent we can call it a mobile home 
agent. But why is it mobile? As it resides on the mobile nodes 
point of attachment, if the mobile node travels to a new 
location it will connect to a new point of attachment which 
will then be responsible for the mobile node as all 
communications are handed over to it. However the mobile 
home agent would not lose communication with the mobile 
node as the software is autonomous and capable of duplicating 
itself to the new point of attachment and resuming its role in 
the network.  Every time the mobile node moves to a new 
point of attachment the mobile home agent will follow 
providing constant location privacy with the advantages of 
low latency communication. This process can be seen in fig 3. 
A new component in a Mipv6 architecture may introduce new 
security threats but work has already been done to protect the 
security of mobile agents themselves limiting the risk of their 
utilization [31]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3. Mobile node and mobile home agent migrating to a new 
point of attachment. 
 
 
B.  Mobile Home Agent used in a Mobile to Static Node 
Communication. 
The introduction of mobile home agents will noticeably 
increase the speed of node communication and protect the 
identity of the mobile nodes’ current location. 
Firstly all nodes should be using cryptographically generated 
address, which have been previously created by the function 
discussed in [17]: 
 
Host ID = HASH62(public key)                                         (2) 
 
In this scenario we will assume that the correspondent node is 
static and so does not require a mobile home agent. 
 
Message 1. 
The mobile node MN attempts to contact the correspondent 
node CN. The mobile node’s public key MNK+, care of 
address CoA and home address HoA are sent to CN the 
correspondent node. Message flows are shown in Fig.1. 
However the CoA care of address given is not the mobile 
nodes true address, it is the address of its Mobile Home 
Agent. This is to protect the location of the mobile node. 
Therefore the proxy care of address which is the Mobile 
Home Agent is represented by MHA.  
In message 2 the correspondent will compare the mobile 
nodes’ public key with the supplied care of address. Under the 
circumstances this test will fail as the mobile home agents care 
of address will not match the public key of the mobile node. 
Therefore the mobile node must supply a public key based on 
the address of the mobile home agent. MHAK+.  
All the messages exchanged can be seen in fig 4. 
 
MN            CN:  MHAK+, MHA, HoA. 
Message 2. 
The corresponding node compares the mobile node’s public 
key with that of its claimed CGA address and determines if 
Mobile Node 
Point of Attachment A
Point of Attachment B
Mobile Node 
Mobile 
Home 
Agent 
Mobile 
Home 
Agent
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they match. If they do then return routability and device 
authentication will proceed, otherwise the connection / 
binding update request is denied. In this case the public key 
and CGA address are those of the mobile home agent. 
The next step the correspondent will perform the home 
address check and the care of address check.  
The correspondent will send a home test (HoT) packet, which 
is assumed that the home agent will tunnel to the mobile node. 
The HoT packet consists of a home keygen token generated 
by hashing the secret key Kcn only known to the 
correspondent. A nonce index is also included to allow the CN 
to find the appropriate nonce easily. 
 
Home token = hash ( Kcn | source address | nonce | 0) 
 
This is then sent to the home agent. 
 
CN            HA:  HoT. 
 
Message 3. 
The Home Test packet is then forwarded to the mobile node’s 
care of address. This is sent directly to the mobile node as it is 
assumed that the home agent is a trusted node and needs to 
know the location of the mobile node anyway. So sending 
data via the Mobile home agent would have no benefit. 
 
HA            MN:  HoT. 
 
Message 4. 
The correspondent also performs a care of address test (CoT), 
which is similar to the home address test and takes place at the 
same time as message 3, however the token generated is 
slightly different. 
 
Care-of token = hash( Kcn |source address|nonce|1) 
 
This is then sent directly to the mobile node within a Care of 
test (CoT) packet. Or so the correspondent thinks. In actuality 
the correspondent node sends the Care of test (CoT) packet to 
the mobile home agent. 
 
CN            MHA:  CoT. 
 
Message 5. 
The mobile home agent tunnels the care of test to the mobile 
node. 
 
MHA            MN:  CoT. 
 
Message 6. 
The mobile node receives both tokens from both the test 
packets sent. It then creates a binding key Kbm by hashing the 
two tokens together. 
 
Kbm = hash ( home token | care-of token ) 
 
The key is used to protect the first and following binding 
updates. The mobile node then sends a binding update request 
to the correspondent node, which is protected with the binding 
key Kbm. 
 
MN            CN:  Kbm(BU) 
 
Message 7. 
This is where traditionally the correspondent would decrypt 
the data and accept the binding update, however before this 
begins it must wait for the result of another authentication 
protocol to complete. This authentication takes place 
simultaneously with return routability.  
The correspondent node sends a request message to the 
mobile node for its authentication data (RAD). 
 
CN            MHA:  RAD 
 
Message 8. 
The mobile home agent tunnels the request for authentication 
data (RAD) to the mobile node. 
 
MHA            MN:  RAD 
 
Message 9. 
The mobile node replies to the message by sending its 
authentication data, which includes the mobile home agents’ 
current address, its sim number, IMEI number, phone number 
and even and option for user authentication such as biometric 
data. This sent to the CN encrypted with the binding key 
Kbm. 
 
MN          CN:  Kbm 
(MHA, Sim No, IMEI, Phone No., Biometric) 
 
Message 10. 
Simultaneously to message 7, the correspondent sends a 
request for authentication data message to the home agent. 
 
CN            HA:  RAD 
 
Message 11. 
The home agent does not have the binding key so sending the 
authentication data would be a security risk. Instead the home 
agent hashes the authentication data together and sends that to 
the correspondent. 
 
HA           CN:  Hash 
(MHA, Sim No, IMEI, Phone No., Biometric) 
 
Message 12. 
Now the correspondent will have both the hash of the 
authentication data and the authentication data encrypted with 
the binding key. The correspondent performs the 
authentication comparison by decrypting the binding key and 
hashing the authentication data received from the mobile node 
then comparing this to the hash received by the home agent. 
If the result of the authentication is successful then the binding 
update is accepted and a binding acknowledgement BA is sent 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS 
Issue 3, Volume 2, 2008
190
  
to the mobile node allowing it to communicate directly with 
the correspondent. 
 
CN            MHA: BA 
 
Message 13, 
The mobile home agent passes the binding acknowledgement 
to the mobile node to let it know that the process has been 
successful. 
 
MHA            MN: BA 
 
The authentication mechanism is optional and is part of the 
distributed authentication protocol. The use of mobile home 
agents can be used on their own, with authentication as seen 
here or it can be used with the full implementation of the 
distributed authentication protocol which utilizes dual identity 
return routability [9] and has support for mobile 
correspondent nodes which can also have their location 
privacy by implementing their own mobile correspondent 
home agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4. Mobile Home Agent message exchange in mobile to 
static communication. 
 
C. Mobile Home Agent used in a Mobile to Mobile Node 
Communication. 
 
In this scenario we will assume that the correspondent node is 
mobile and so requires a mobile home agent. 
 
Message 1. 
The mobile node MN attempts to contact the correspondent 
node CN. The correspondent node however is not directly 
contactable because it is mobile and it too has a Mobile Home 
Agent. The Mobile node will have to contact the 
correspondent’s traditional home agent first which will then 
forward the messages to the correspondent node. The mobile 
node’s public key MNK+, care of address CoA and home 
address HoA are sent to the HA2 Home Agent of the CN the 
correspondent node. Message flows are shown in Fig.5. 
However the CoA care of address given is not the mobile 
nodes true address, it is the address of its Mobile Home 
Agent. This is to protect the location of the mobile node. 
Therefore the proxy care of address which is the Mobile 
Home Agent is represented by MHA.  
In message 3 the correspondent will compare the mobile 
nodes’ public key with the supplied care of address. Under the 
circumstances this test will fail as the mobile home agents care 
of address will not match the public key of the mobile node. 
Therefore the mobile node must supply a public key based on 
the address of the mobile home agent. MHAK+.  
All the messages exchanged can be seen in fig 5. 
 
MN            HA2:  MHAK+, MHA, HoA. 
 
Message 2. 
The Correspondent Node’s Home Agent received the message 
from the Mobile Node and forwards it to the correspondent 
node. 
 
HA2            CN:  MHAK+, MHA, HoA. 
 
Message 3. 
The correspondent node compares the mobile node’s public 
key with that of its claimed CGA address and determines if 
they match. If they do then return routability and device 
authentication will proceed, otherwise the connection / 
binding update request is denied. In this case the public key 
and CGA address are those of the mobile home agent. 
The next step the correspondent will perform the home 
address check and the care of address check.  
The correspondent will send a home test (HoT) packet, which 
is assumed that the home agent will tunnel to the mobile node. 
The HoT packet consists of a home keygen token generated 
by hashing the secret key Kcn only known to the 
correspondent. A nonce index is also included to allow the CN 
to find the appropriate nonce easily. 
 
Home token = hash ( Kcn | source address | nonce | 0) 
 
This is then sent to the home agent. 
 
CN            HA:  HoT. 
 
Message 4. 
The Home Test packet is then forwarded to the mobile node’s 
care of address. This is sent directly to the mobile node as it is 
assumed that the home agent is a trusted node and needs to 
know the location of the mobile node anyway. So sending 
data via the mobile home agent would have no benefit. 
 
HA            MN:  HoT. 
 
Message 5. 
The correspondent also performs a care of address test (CoT), 
which is similar to the home address test and takes place at the 
same time as message 3, however the token generated is 
slightly different. 
 
Care-of token = hash( Kcn |source address|nonce|1) 
MN 
CN
MHA
HA
3
13 
8
5
2 10 11
12 
7
4
1
6
9
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS 
Issue 3, Volume 2, 2008
191
  
This is then sent directly to the mobile node within a Care of 
test (CoT) packet. Or so the correspondent thinks. In actuality 
the correspondent node sends the Care of test (CoT) packet to 
the mobile home agent. 
 
CN            MHA:  CoT. 
 
Message 6. 
The mobile home agent tunnels the care of test to the mobile 
node. 
 
MHA            MN:  CoT. 
 
Message 7. 
The mobile node receives both tokens from both the test 
packets sent. It then creates a binding key Kbm by hashing the 
two tokens together. 
 
Kbm = hash ( home token | care-of token ) 
 
The key is used to protect the first and following binding 
updates. The mobile node then sends a binding update request 
to the correspondent node, via  the correspondents home 
agent, which is protected with the binding key Kbm. 
 
MN            HA2:  Kbm(BU) 
 
Message 8. 
The Correspondents home agent forwards the binding update request to 
the correspondent node. 
 
HA2            CN:  Kbm(BU) 
Message 9. 
This is where traditionally the correspondent would decrypt 
the data and accept the binding update, however before this 
begins it must wait for the result of another authentication 
protocol to complete. This authentication takes place 
simultaneously with return routability.  
The correspondent node sends a request message to the 
mobile node for its authentication data (RAD). 
 
CN            MHA:  RAD 
Message 10. 
The mobile home agent tunnels the request for authentication 
data (RAD) to the mobile node. 
 
MHA            MN:  RAD 
Message 11. 
The mobile node replies to the message by sending its 
authentication data, which includes the mobile home agents’ 
current address, its sim number, IMEI number, phone number 
and even and option for user authentication such as biometric 
data. This is sent to the CN, via HA2, encrypted with the 
binding key Kbm. 
 
MN          HA2:  Kbm 
(MHA, Sim No, IMEI, Phone No., Biometric) 
 
Message 12. 
The correspondent’s mobile home agent, HA2, forwards the 
encrypted authentication data to the correspondent. 
 
HA2          CN:  Kbm 
(MHA, Sim No, IMEI, Phone No., Biometric) 
 
Message 13. 
Simultaneously to message 9, the correspondent sends a 
request for authentication data message to the home agent. 
 
CN            HA:  RAD 
Message 14. 
The home agent does not have the binding key so sending the 
authentication data would be a security risk. Instead the home 
agent hashes the authentication data together and sends that to 
the correspondent via it’s home agent. 
 
HA           HA2:  Hash 
(MHA, Sim No, IMEI, Phone No., Biometric) 
 
Message 15. 
The correspondents home agent forwards the authentication 
data to the home agent. 
 
HA2           CN:  Hash 
(MHA, Sim No, IMEI, Phone No., Biometric) 
 
Message 16. 
Now the correspondent will have both the hash of the 
authentication data and the authentication data encrypted with 
the binding key. The correspondent performs the 
authentication comparison by decrypting the binding key and 
hashing the authentication data received from the mobile node 
then comparing this to the hash received by the home agent. 
 
If the result of the authentication is successful then the binding 
update is accepted and a binding acknowledgement BA is sent 
to the mobile node allowing it to communicate directly with 
the correspondent via it’s mobile home agent, which speeds 
up the communication and still maintains location privacy. 
 
CN            MHA: BA 
 
Message 17, 
The mobile home agent passes the binding acknowledgement 
to the mobile node to let it know that the process has been 
successful. 
 
MHA            MN: BA 
 
The authentication mechanism is optional and is part of the 
distributed authentication protocol. The use of mobile home 
agents can be used on their own, with authentication as seen 
here or it can be used with the full implementation of the 
distributed authentication protocol which utilizes dual identity 
return routability [9]. The above message exchange allows for 
mobile correspondent nodes to also have their location privacy 
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by implementing their own mobile correspondent home agents 
which communicate directly with the mobile nodes mobile 
home agent, acting as a secure proxy with negligible 
communication latency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5. Mobile Home Agent message exchange in mobile to 
mobile communication. 
 
Once the protocol has completed authentication of the mobile 
and correspondent nodes and the binding update has been 
exchanged, then direct route optimized communication can 
take place between the communicating nodes via the Mobile 
Home Agents on the points of attachment shown in Fig 6. 
This provides low latency communication with the benefit of a 
non processor intensive location privacy security solution due 
to the mobile agent software not running on the mobile device 
itself but running on the points of attachment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6, Communication between mobile to mobile nodes via 
mobile home agents on points of attachment 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that the Mobile IPv6 route optimization 
protocol is vulnerable to a variety of attacks which attempt to 
disrupt or hijack communication between the mobile and the 
correspondent nodes.  
This paper investigated several security solutions which were 
specifically designed to protect location privacy. But the main 
drawback of these solutions was an increase in latency 
between communication of the mobile node and the 
correspondent. 
A second technology, mobile agents, were investigated which 
could potentially change the way networks operate. These are 
autonomous software based programs which can migrate to 
another node on the network independently of any other 
process. They work well in heterogeneous networks and are 
capable of managing network messages. 
This technology was the basis for the proposed security 
protocol using mobile home agents. Mobile home agents act 
as a proxy home agent which follows the mobile node as it 
moves from point of attachment to point of attachment. The 
mobile home agent resides on the point of attachment itself 
therefore even though technically the solution reintroduces 
triangle routing in some respect, in reality there is a negligible 
latency increase as the data packet would have to pass via the 
point of attachment anyway to reach the mobile node.  
The mobile home agent preserves the mobile nodes location 
privacy by acting as a proxy and passing all messages to the 
mobile node via a secure tunnel.  
When the mobile node migrates to a new point of attachment 
the mobile home agent duplicates itself and is transmitted to 
the new point of attachment when it continues to act as the 
proxy for the mobile node. The home agent keeps track of 
both of these entities to ensure they are reachable.  
The advantage of the proposed solution is that it is entirely 
software based and no new hardware would be needed to be 
introduced, making it a very cost effective option. The 
location of the mobile node is protected without the cost of 
increased latency. 
The only disadvantages rest with the fact that the mobile home 
agent is autonomous and so its behavior relies heavily on its 
robust programming and that every point of attachment may 
have to be modified to accept mobile agents.  
The proposed solution will be tested with the network 
simulation software Opnet. The results will be gathered and 
compared to other security solutions in terms of effectiveness 
and impact on latency and resources. It is believed that this 
proposal will provide a robust and unique security solution. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
MN    Mobile node  
CN     Correspondent node  
HA     Home agent  
 HA2  Correspondents’ Home agent 
H(m)    A hash of message m  
K+     Public Key  
K-     Private Key  
MNK+    Mobile nodes’ public key 
 MHAK+  Mobile Home Agent Public Key 
 HoA    Home Agent Address 
 CoA     Care of Address 
 HoT     Home Keygen Token 
 CoT     Care of Keygen Token 
 Kbm    Binding Key 
 BU     Binding Update 
 BA     Binding Acknowledgement   
 RAD    Request for Authentication Data 
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